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PEDAGOGY OF THE SUPPRESSED:  
A CLASS ON RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
 
By Phyllis Goldfarb* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 A generation ago, Duncan Kennedy examined the myriad structures through 
which American law schools train students to take up elite roles in society.  Within these 
structures, leftist analyses of social and political dynamics play a marginal role.1  Nearly 
a quarter century after the publication of Legal Education and the Reproduction of 
Hierarchy,2 the curricular structures Kennedy critiqued remain entrenched.  
 This symposium examines important questions derived from Kennedy’s 
observations.  For example, if law schools are infused with elitist norms, can a 
progressive perspective emerge from the legal academy?  There is considerable reason to 
doubt that any classroom setting located within the hierarchical framework of legal 
education can advance the project of unmaking hierarchy.  Were such a pedagogical 
project remotely possible, it would seem to require, as Monty Python prescribes, 
something completely different.  Perhaps this explains why pedagogical experiments in 
legal education have been undertaken so infrequently.  3  
                                                 
*Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  Thanks to Pierre Schlag, Reggie Oh, and Sharon Beckman 
for discussing these ideas with me and to Billy Moore for helping me locate sources.   I am grateful to 
Boston College Law School for research support and to Cesar Garcia and Ben Wish for research assistance.  
1 Duncan Kennedy, Remarks at Teaching from the Left Conference, Harvard Law School (Mar. 11, 2006) 
(noting that leftist analysis of social and political dynamics, while marginal, are not  entirely absent).  See 
also William H. Simon, Fear and Loathing of Politics in the Legal Academy, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 175 
(2001) (noting pervasive opposition in legal scholarship to leftist politics and theory.) 
2 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982). 
3 When reproaching Christopher Columbus Langdell, the founder of the prevailing appellate case method 
of legal education, for excluding law practice from legal education, Jerome Frank opined that “American 
legal education went badly wrong some seventy years ago.”  Jerome Frank,  A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 
YALE L. J. 1303, 1303 (1947).  Despite the passage of an additional sixty years since Frank’s remarks, and 
the development of law school clinical programs during this period, appellate case methodologies for 
studying law still dominate legal education, although some curricular reform may be on the horizon.  See 
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 While I recognize the force of these views, I have not fully adopted them.  
Instead, as I have argued elsewhere, I find progressive possibilities in connections 
between legal critique and legal practice, such as those that can be forged in a law school 
clinic.4  My intention here is to pose a related claim—that legal critique would benefit 
from a pedagogy..5    
 One source for a pedagogy of critique might be radical educational theory such as 
that elaborated by Paulo Freire, who saw that teachers are also students, students are also 
teachers, and that a learning community might collectively construct its curricular 
choices, its reading lists, and its allocations of shared responsibility for teaching a chosen 
subject.6  Although I have employed Freire-inspired egalitarian educational experiments 
in the past, what I am suggesting now is something far more modest, perhaps deceptively 
so.  What I explore here is whether the most conventional method of legal education—
examination of appellate judges’ opinions—can be channeled toward progressive ends.   
 The challenges are weighty.  Judicial opinions are designed to “shut down 
thought” and put “issues to rest,” Pierre Schlag warns, and reading approximately ten-
thousand cases over three years of law school inscribes a vision of case law as law, 
suppressing broader visions of what law is.7  Voicing similar concerns nearly seventy-
                                                                                                                                                 
Sacha Pfeiffer, Twas a Time…, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 2006, at D1 (discussing proposed curricular reform 
efforts at Harvard Law School). 
4 See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991); Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on 
Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, Picking Up the Law, 57 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 973 (2003). 
5  I view this claim as a corollary to the proposition that, in Joanne Conaghan’s words, “the indissolubility 
of theory and practice is a leftist platform.”  Joanne Conaghan, Remarks at the Teaching from the Left 
Conference, Harvard Law School (Mar. 11, 2006).  
6 PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 61 (1970) (advocating pedagogy initiated and directed by 
the disempowered rather than formed by those in control).  
7 Pierre Schlag, Ten Thousand Cases, Maybe More—An Essay on Centrism in Legal Education, 2 AGORA 
2 (2002), http://agora.stanford.edu/agora/volume2/schlag.shtml; Pierre Schlag, The Theory and Practice of 
Everyday Doctrine, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE [ ] (2007).  
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five years ago, Jerome Frank reminded us that “[law students] do not study cases.  They 
do not even study the printed records of cases (although that would be little enough), let 
alone cases as living processes.  Their attention is restricted to “judicial opinions” that do 
not typically set forth “the real causal explanation[s] of the decisions.”8  By convention, 
Frank implies, actual explanations for decisions are suppressed, misleading their readers 
and perhaps their authors too..   
 Nonetheless, I am suggesting here that engaging the most traditional of law 
school pedagogies—the examination of United States Supreme Court opinions—can 
facilitate progressive insights when legal doctrine is contextualized.   I am buoyed in this 
suggestion by Amsterdam and Bruner’s excavation of Supreme Court case law in their 
extraordinary work Minding the Law.9  Through their analysis of numerous Supreme 
Court opinions, the authors trace the source of the categories and rhetorics of legal 
doctrine to our deepest cultural narratives.  To surface the suppressed cultural content that 
pervades court opinions is to understand far more consciously the nature and power of 
judicial lawmaking.    
As Amsterdam and Bruner reveal so effectively, discerning what animates a court 
opinion requires reading between and beneath the words on the page.   Although the 
method I propose is far more prosaic than theirs, I am suggesting here that 
contextualizing case law in a variety of ways offers some hope of illuminating its 
plausible animating forces and assumptions.  This approach is especially promising when 
used to examine cases concerning American criminal justice because the methodology 
                                                 
8 Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PENN. L. REV. 907, 910 (1933) (emphasis in 
original) (critiquing the “Harvard system” of legal education, which focuses on studying opinions, as 
inadequate preparation for the real work of a lawyer, which involves making fact-sensitive judgments). 
9 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000). 
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can be directed toward highlighting the attitudes found within mainstream legal culture 
for inflicting state violence on the disempowered.  To my mind, this content lends itself 
to a left-leaning analysis.  Moreover, since law students are already familiar with 
engaging standard legal texts, the accessibility of this approach may enhance the impact 
of a non-standard analysis. 
Although I use words like “left-leaning” and “non-standard” to describe this 
analysis, I understand that it may stand in a contradictory relationship to some 
understandings of leftist politics.  A methodology that plumbs conventional legal sources 
like Supreme Court cases, even one that further contextualizes these texts to expose what 
lies behind their logical veneer,10 can simultaneously defy and reinforce liberal 
legalism.11 If this method is construed as an effort to spur a liberal democratic regime to 
refine its legal norms, it may serve microtransformative ends, but not a broader 
transformative project of power-shifting that, by some lights, describes left political 
aims.12   
                                                 
10 John Noonan has described the way that law’s analytic reasoning hides moral and  political views.  JOHN 
NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON , AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF 
THE MASKS (1976).  
11 This is a version of the “double bind” phenomenon, much noted in critical legal scholarship, in which all 
options available to the subordinated are in some way harmful to them.  See, e.g., John O. Calmore, A Call 
to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and 
Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1938 (asserting that oppressive conditions generally create double 
binds) (quoting MARILYN FRYE, OPPRESSION, IN POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 
60, 60-61 (Leslie Bender & Dann Braveman eds., 1995)); Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical 
Approaches and the Double Bind of Surrogacy, 69 CHI.-KENT L.REV. 303 (1993) (describing the way that 
feminist law reforms, whether in the area of reproductive surrogacy or elsewhere, involve double binds); 
Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory Choice of 
Motherhood,  9  J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 (2005) (explaining double-bind problems in women’s reliance 
on assisted reproductive technologies); Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: 
Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783 (2003) (demonstrating that 
multiple theories of law create a double bind between “efficiency” and “redistribution.”)  
12 In their recent anthology that tries to enliven the practice of progressive legal critique, Wendy Brown and 
Janet Halley argue that the left needs bolder theory unencumbered by the imperatives of concrete political 
strategy.   WENDY BROWN & JANET HALLEY, Introduction, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 2, 33 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).  My approach is more akin to one that Martha McCluskey 
attributes to critical theorist Gayatri Spivak, that “theory is a strategy” and conversely that “strategy is a 
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My overarching assertion is that the proposed methodology, paradoxically 
dependent as it is on the liberal legalism it questions, accomplishes something 
progressive in exposing both the values that underlie the hyperrationality of legal analysis 
and the difficulties of pursuing social, economic, and political justice within a rule-of-law 
framework.  Yet a contest remains as to whether, by implicitly legitimating the very 
authorities that it explicitly challenges, the method constrains transformation more than 
facilitating it.  In light of that contest, the ambivalent posture toward mainstream legality 
that I adopt is a useful place to stand.13  Moreover, the method I articulate here 
recommends ambivalence as a gray but fertile land within which law school teaching 
from the left can operate with least discomfort.    
 
. 
 
II. An Example  
If I have had any success as a teacher in mining beneath the surface of judicial 
opinions to extract progressive insights, it has occurred in my course on the Death 
Penalty.. In this course, I have taught a class that represents the most evolved pedagogical 
example that I have of tapping the progressive possibilities in the study of appellate 
opinions.  This is a class that I devote to Warren McCleskey, a black man convicted of 
killing a white police officer.   
                                                                                                                                                 
theory.”  See Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking With Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
13 McCluskey’s observations are consistent with this choice to respond to a double bind by consciously 
cultivating ambivalence.  See, e.g.,  McCluskey, supra note 13, at 58 (“[E]schewing legalism is as illusory 
a route to power as embracing legalism.”) 
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 A class that concerns Warren McCleskey would necessarily concern  
McCleskey’s odyssey through the legal system to his death.   In law schools, this is 
taught almost exclusively, when it is taught at all, through his best-known case before the 
Supreme Court, McCleskey v. Kemp.14  My class too involves McCleskey v. Kemp, in 
which the Supreme Court rejects McCleskey’s arguments that a demonstrated pattern of 
race discrimination in the allocation of death sentences in Georgia violated the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.   
When I teach McCleskey v. Kemp, a searing case that reveals ugly realities about 
American law and American society, I teach it in conjunction with Warren McCleskey’s 
subsequent case before the Supreme Court, McCleskey v. Zant15  The latter is often 
ignored despite the fact that the Zant case finally seals McCleskey’s fate.  Its opinion is 
searing too, although as a federal habeas corpus case, its ugliness is masked by its 
technical doctrinal detail..  When read together, the two opinions expose more about the 
jurisprudence of the American death penalty than either does alone.  Instead of 
compartmentalizing opinions by the subject of their doctrine—which in and of itself can 
stifle structural insights16—reading these cases together offers at least some sense of how 
                                                 
14 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that a statistical study offered to prove discrimination in the application of 
the death penalty did not establish violations of the Eighth or  Fourteenth Amendments, despite significant 
race-of-victim effects).  My impression is that Kemp is taught to relatively few law students because it falls 
outside the standard content of classes in Constitutional Law and Criminal Law.  Some constitutional law 
casebooks include brief descriptions of the case.  See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
584-89 (2001); DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 163–64 (2d ed. 1998).  Others omit it entirely.  
See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN, JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th ed. 
2005); CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES (2d ed. 2005); 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (14th ed. 2001). 
15 499 U.S. 467 (1991). 
16 See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 596 (“[T]he materials present every legal issue as distinct from every 
other, as a tub on its own bottom . . . with no hope or even any reason to hope that from law study one 
might derive an integrating vision of what law is, how it works, or how it might be changed.”). 
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the legal system looked to McCleskey, and to his lawyers, as they brought multiple 
grievances to multiple courts. 
A. Historical Contexts 
Among the critical contexts for understanding Warren McCleskey’s appearance 
before the United States Supreme Court is America’s history of subordination by race, 
from slavery to the present.  A cursory glance at this notorious and protracted history is 
all that can be offered either in my class or in this essay. 17 Yet even a glance is enough to 
notice the connection between race and the death penalty.   
When viewing data about the contemporary administration of the death penalty 
through a historical lens,18 students recognize that the states that rely most heavily on the 
death penalty are states of the Old Confederacy.19  The class might then be directed to 
                                                 
17 Professor Tobias Wolff offers an efficient and effective pedagogy for contextualizing contemporary 
policy issues regarding race.  At the beginning of class, he draws a historical timeline on the board showing 
the vast expansion of race-based chattel slavery in America from 1619-1865.  The timeline then depicts the 
Civil War followed by Reconstruction.   Reconstruction ends in 1877 with the official abandonment of the 
newly freed slaves and the formal embrace of their second-class citizenship in an era marked by lynching 
practices and Jim Crow laws.   A glimmer of change does not emerge until 1954 with Brown v. Board of 
Education, followed in the mid-1960s by the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act which were 
seriously enforced for but a dozen years.  From 1978 to the present, the timeline depicts the Court and the 
federal government stepping back from efforts to achieve racial equality.  If the timeline is drawn even 
remotely to scale, it graphically conveys three-and-a half centuries of formal racial tyranny, followed by 
less than two decades of attempts at redress, and an even longer period of imposing significant limitations 
on such attempts.   Tobias Barrington Wolff, Tobias Wolff’s Racial Equity Progress Timeline, 
http://www.equaljusticesociety.org/wolff_timeline.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
18  In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court struck down state death penalty statutes 
that gave capital juries unrestricted discretion to sentence capital defendants to life or death.  In response to 
Furman, many states passed guided discretion statutes that asked the sentencer, typically after a separate 
sentencing hearing following conviction, to find one or more specified aggravating circumstances before 
issuing a sentence of death.   The contemporary death penalty era commenced when the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of guided discretion statutes in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
207 (1976), and its companion cases from the states of Florida and Texas .  See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 
242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).  At the same time, the Supreme Court struck down 
mandatory death penalty statutes enacted in North Carolina and Louisiana, because they led automatically 
to death sentences upon the conviction of specified crimes, without affording discretion to issue a life 
sentence.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 
21 As of  January, 2007, when ranked in order of numbers of executions, the top ten death penalty states 
since 1976 are Texas (381 executions), Virginia (98 executions), Oklahoma (84 executions), Missouri (66 
executions), Florida (64 executions), North Carolina (43 executions), Georgia (39 executions), South 
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slave codes that gave automatic death sentences to blacks for various crimes, especially 
those against whites,20  and to studies of rape law enforcement revealing that the most 
brutal punishments, particularly in southern states, were reserved almost exclusively for 
black men charged with raping white women, despite the backdrop reality that white 
slavemasters commonly raped black women.21  Urging students to articulate the likely 
ideological purposes of these historical phenomena begins to illuminate the origins of the 
death penalty system that Warren McCleskey faced   
Next the class might turn to the history of lynching and consider how lynching is 
connected to the death penalty.22  The students might learn that history is replete with 
                                                                                                                                                 
Carolina (36 executions), Alabama (35 executions), and Louisiana (27 executions). Together these ten 
states account for greater than eighty percent of the more than one-thousand executions in the United States 
in the post-Gregg era.  DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 3 
(2007), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2007.)   
20 George Stroud’s research confirms that nineteenth century penal codes in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia defined certain crimes 
as capital offenses when committed by slaves and non-capital offenses when committed by whites.  
GEORGE STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 158-188 (1856). For example, in Virginia and Mississippi, death was the prescribed 
punishment for slaves for every enumerated offense, but only for a small fraction of offenses committed by 
whites.   Id., at 170, 176.   See also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law Only As An 
Enemy”: The Legitimation of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum Laws of 
Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 977 (1992) (stating that Virginia statutes imposed the death penalty for 
slaves for at least 68 offenses, whereas whites committing the same acts were punished by imprisonment or 
not at all); DANIEL J. FLANIGAN, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1800-1868 24-27 (1987) 
(reporting that statutes in Alabama, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia authorized death for slaves and free 
blacks convicted of burglary, arson, or destruction of a house, building, or other property (including grain, 
corn, and other goods produced by whites) although whites committing the same offense would be 
sentenced to pay restitution or to serve 2-5 years in prison.) 
 
 
21 Classic sources that might be deployed for developing aspects of this context are KENNETH M. STAMPP, 
THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., 
IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS—THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).  
See also PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX 
IN AMERICA (1984); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1977).   
William Bowers notes that in Georgia, the death penalty was required for a black man who raped a 
white woman, but in the unlikely event that a white man were convicted of raping a black woman, he 
would receive a minimum sentence of two years in prison.  See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: 
DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 140 (1984). 
22 This topic is the subject of a recent anthology.  See FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE; RACE 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. and Austin Sarat, eds., 2006).   
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examples of white mobs held at bay by assurances from a judge or a sheriff that the black 
man on trial would be sentenced to death.23  Indeed, as in the notorious Scottsboro case 
involving nine young black men falsely accused of raping two young white women in 
Alabama in the early 1930s, death penalty trials against blacks for violent crimes against 
whites have been described as legal lynchings.24  Jim Crow laws, which formally 
enshrined views of black inferiority and were enforced through legal and extra-legal 
violence, would add to this picture of a dual legal system, imbued with ideologies of 
race.25  The cumulative effect of the unrelenting litany helps frame the idea that state 
criminal justice systems were used in lieu of slavery as the institutional mechanism for 
subordinating black people, keeping many of them literally in bondage, and transmitting 
the message that black lives are not and will never be equal to white lives.26   
 After looking at the many ways that state criminal justice systems were pressed 
into service of this message, we see why, in the mid-twentieth century, lawyers for 
national civil rights organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund began to 
represent poor black defendants charged with crimes and how these cases created the 
                                                 
23 See LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY (1979) (scrutinizing 
lynching and criminal justice practices during the Reconstruction era).  Scholars suggest that the fear of 
federal anti-lynching legislation spurred Southern states to turn away from lynching in the early twentieth 
century. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 21 (1987).  It is a short leap from lynching to death 
sentences imposed by all-white juries on black defendants to send a similar message about racial 
subordination.   
 
24 See, e.g., JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 24–31 (1994).  Dan Carter writes that in their pleas 
to lynch mobs, Southern officials implicitly promised that the outcomes of capital trials would differ from 
lynchings only in their external forms.  DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN 
SOUTH 115 (1969).  The Reverend Jesse Jackson uses the term “legal lynching” as the title of his recent 
book on race and the death penalty.  REV. JESSE JACKSON WITH JESSE JACKSON, JR., LEGAL LYNCHING: 
RACISM, INJUSTICE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1996).   
25 See generally, C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974) (providing 
background on Jim Crow laws). 
26 Lawrence Friedman writes that many white Southerners defended the death sentences in the Scottsboro 
case as if their way of life depended on black defendants in cases like these receiving extreme punishment.  
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 376 (1993). 
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impetus to advocate for the application of the Bill of Rights to the states, for the 
constitutionalization of criminal procedure, and for greater access to the federal courts 
through the writ of habeas corpus.27  A goal common to all of these efforts was to curb 
the worst abuses associated with racialized enforcement of criminal law in the states.28  
However, years after the societal impulse toward curbing these abuses had ended, David 
Baldus demonstrated in a meticulous study of Georgia sentencing practices that the 
pattern of racialized punishment remains.29   
The outline is clear.  Throughout American history, from slavery to lynching to 
the death penalty, state violence has been most frequently and most harshly used for 
blacks believed to have harmed whites.  Through his lawyers at the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, McCleskey used Baldus’ research to establish empirically what many 
observers already knew--that a systematic pattern of discrimination was in place in the 
administration of the death penalty.30   This rendered McCleskey’s death sentences and 
many others vulnerable under prevailing interpretations of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.   
 
                                                 
27 See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 85 (1998) (“The blood of the Scottsboro cases courses 
through all these decisions . . . which forced state law enforcement officials to observe federal 
constitutional standards.”). 
28 Id. (“Scottsboro was a potent symbol of what could go wrong locally in the American judicial system and 
a spur to both those who would expunge bigotry from the system and those seeking to enforce national 
standards of justice upon the states.”) 
29 Using sophisticated statistical techniques in an effort to isolate the role that race may have played in 
capital sentencing from the role that more than two hundred legitimate factors may have played, Iowa law 
professor David Baldus and his research team concluded that criminal defendants convicted of killing white 
people were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than were those convicted of killing black 
people.  DAVID BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH, & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 143 (1990). Having a white victim proved as 
significant an explanatory factor in who received death sentences as having a prior murder conviction.  Id. 
at 147. 
30 In McCleskey v. Kemp, Justice Powell assumes the statistical validity of the Baldus study.  481 U.S. 279, 
291, n.7 (1987). 
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B. Doctrinal Contexts 
 That in the1980s the Supreme Court rejected McCleskey’s powerful Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment arguments is, sadly, not surprising.31  Yet how the Supreme 
Court reached that decision is instructive. All McCleskey had to show to establish that his 
death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on Cruel and Unusual 
                                                 
31 The 1980s was a decade when Justice Powell and other Supreme Court justices publicly vented their 
unhappiness that litigation efforts had dramatically impeded executions in the states.  See, e.g., Linda 
Greenhouse, Justice Powell Assails Delay in Carrying Out Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1983, at A16.  
The outcomes of most of the death penalty cases that the Supreme Court decided during this period were 
consistent with these sentiments. E.g ., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (death sentence is 
constitutional despite invalidation by state supreme court of one of three aggravating circumstances found 
by jury); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (psychiatrist’s testimony about future dangerousness  
based on hypothetical questions but no examination of defendant did not undermine reliability of death 
sentence); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (death penalty is constitutional despite reliance by 
sentencer on an aggravating circumstance not authorized by state’s sentencing statute); California v. 
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (jury instruction that life without parole sentence could be commuted by 
governor did not undermine reliability of death sentence); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 
(defense counsel’s failure to seek or present evidence at capital sentencing hearing was not ineffective 
assistance due to strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (retreating from need to show with 
unmistakable clarity that prospective capital juror would automatically vote against death penalty before 
being struck for cause from capital case); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (excluding jurors who 
oppose death penalty from determination of guilt as well as sentence does not violate capital defendant’s 
right to fair and impartial jury, even where social science evidence shows juries so constituted are more 
conviction-prone);  Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (prosecutor’s inflammatory closing 
argument did not render trial unfair or sentence unreliable, nor did defense attorney’s failure to present 
mitigating evidence constitute ineffective assistance); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (capital 
defendant’s constitutional claim was defaulted in post-conviction phase because his attorney failed to raise 
it on direct appeal, although ineffective assistance not established);  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) 
(although petitioners did not kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill, death sentences were constitutional 
because petitioners were major participants in felony who showed reckless indifference to human life); 
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (representation of co-defendant by defense counsel’s law partner did 
not create a conflict of interest that established ineffective assistance, nor did failure to present mitigating 
evidence at capital sentencing hearing); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (defendant’s death 
sentence not unconstitutional although imposed after sole aggravating factor found by jury duplicated an 
element of the offense of which he was convicted); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (indigent 
capital defendants not entitled to appointed counsel in state post-conviction proceedings);  Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (execution of mentally retarded is not cruel and unusual punishment 
although jury instructions must allow evidence of mental retardation to be given mitigating effect); 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (death penalty for defendants age 16 or 17 at time of crime is 
not cruel and unusual punishment). 
Edward Lazarus understands views such as those expressed by Justice Powell as referenda on “the 
legacy of Scottsboro—on the idea that racism is endemic; that state judicial systems, especially in the 
South, cannot be trusted; and that the federal courts and, ultimately, the Supreme Court must serve as the 
guarantors of social justice.”  LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 85. 
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Punishment was a systematic pattern of discriminatory enforcement.32   Despite the fact 
that the Baldus study establishes exactly this, Powell, in a notably tepid opinion, denied 
Eighth Amendment relief on the grounds that maintaining discretion in jury trials is a 
constitutional value of overriding importance.33   Implicit in this holding is the view that 
maintaining jury discretion is a more important value than eliminating race 
discrimination in capital sentencing. 
 McCleskey also argued to no avail that purposeful discrimination in his 
sentencing violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In a 
single footnote, Powell denied the relevance of the long historical record of purposeful 
discrimination in the imposition of Georgia’s criminal penalties, particularly its capital 
penalties, which  McCleskey had offered as circumstantial evidence of present 
purposes.34  McCleskey’s showing of purposeful discrimination was as strong as in 
previous cases that found equal protection violations in employment and in jury selection.  
However, Powell—counterintuitively and in contradiction with those cases—held that the 
                                                 
32 This is the meaning of the per curiam opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (capital 
sentencing procedures that lead to substantial risk of arbitrariness and discrimination in the administration 
of the death penalty violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).  See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (death penalty must be imposed “fairly, and with reasonable consistency,or not at 
all.”) 
 
33 For example, Powell reasons:  
Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume 
that what is unexplained is invidious.  In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias 
in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits 
that discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not 
demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital-
sentencing process. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. at 313.  
34 Id.  at 298, n.20 (“Although the history of racial discrimination in this country is undeniable, we cannot 
accept official actions taken long ago as evidence of current intent.”). 
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burden of establishing purposeful discrimination must be higher in death penalty cases 
than in other scenarios.35  
The word “risk” appears numerous times in the majority opinion of McCleskey v. 
Kemp, even in the first sentence.36   Clearly, some kind of risk was prominent in Justice 
Powell’s mind—maybe reputational risks to the judiciary or risks to the stability of the 
criminal justice system.  Maybe it was also a concern for the risk that race was 
determining who lived and who died.  But if so, his words do not indicate it.  In his 
majority opinion, Powell never grapples with the source, the magnitude, or the 
implications of the risk that race strongly influences decisions about who receives death 
as a criminal punishment.. 
 Four years later, on McCleskey’s return to the Supreme Court with his federal 
habeas corpus claims in Zant, nothing in the second case formally raised issues of race, 
Nonetheless, the subject must have been present to all involved, as McCleskey was the 
same petitioner with the same lawyers who had dragged the Supreme Court through the 
                                                 
35 See id. at 296–97 (distinguishing discrimination in Title VII and venire-selection cases from 
discrimination in capital sentencing cases); id. at 297 (“Because discretion is essential to the criminal 
justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has 
been abused.”).  Under previous precedents, had McCleskey raised a claim of systematic discrimination in 
jury selection or in employment, the statistical evidence he presented would seem to have established a 
prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  To deem inadequate the level of proof of 
discrimination that the Baldus study established for capital cases appears inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s insistence on heightened reliability in proceedings where death is punishment.  See, e.g., Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).  When the Court has intoned that “death is different”, see id.; 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411(1986),,it is intended to imply greater—not lesser—procedural care.  
 
36 481 U.S. at 282–83 (“This case presents the question whether a complex statistical study that indicates a 
risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing determinations proves that petitioner 
McCleskey's capital sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).  See also 
id. at 291 n.7 (“Even a sophisticated multiple-regression analysis such as the Baldus study can only 
demonstrate a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily 
lesser risk that race entered into any particular decision.” (emphasis in the original)); id. at 308–309 
(“There is, of course, some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury’s decision in a criminal case.  There 
are similar risks that other kinds of prejudice will influence other criminal trials.  The question is ‘at what 
point that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable.’ McCleskey asks us to accept the likelihood 
allegedly shown by the Baldus study as the constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of race prejudice 
influencing capital sentencing decisions….")(citations omitted).  
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embarrassment of the race discrimination case in the first place.37  Moreover, as observed 
earlier, federal habeas corpus remedies grew out of the same racialized dynamics that led 
to efforts to assert greater federal oversight over state criminal justice processes.38   
 In Zant, McCleskey petitioned the court for habeas relief after new evidence was 
unearthed: a twenty-one-page police document revealing that the police had planted an 
informant in McCleskey’s cell after McCleskey had been formally charged with 
murder.39  The Supreme Court has held that this practice is illegal because once the 
adversarial process has begun, the Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants’ right 
to talk to the police only through their lawyers.40  But the issue in McCleskey’s second 
petition to the Supreme Court was not whether his conviction was obtained 
unconstitutionally.  Rather, it was whether McCleskey could use a second (or a 
“successor”) habeas petition to ask a federal court to reverse his capital conviction when 
evidence that established the unconstitutionality of the conviction emerged after the 
litigation of his first petition.41  McCleskey had omitted the Sixth Amendment claim 
from his first petition because for years the police had falsely denied that the jailmate was 
                                                 
37 Lazarus maintains that a majority of the Supreme Court justices—the five who voted against McCleskey 
in his first case before them—did not want to hear McCleskey’s race discrimination claims.  Despite the 
fact that race discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty is a matter of grave national 
consequence, only four justices—the four dissenters in Kemp—voted to grant certiorari in the case, over the 
stated objections of Justice Powell.  See LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 189–91.  
One likely target of Justice Powell’s and others’ frustrations concerning death penalty delays, see 
supra note 27 and accompanying text, was the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), the instigator and 
organizer of the national capital litigation campaign.  That McCleskey was their client, and that his race 
discrimination claims had generated considerable delays in executions around the country, may have 
helped to harden these justices against him and his claims for relief.  For support of this possibility, see 
LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 189–190, 197, 202–05.  For arguments in support of the general proposition 
that judges’ emotions can be influential in how they decide cases, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING 
FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004). 
38 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.   
39 Zant, 499 U.S. at 474. 
40 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (reversing federal narcotics convictions due to admission 
at trial of defendant’s statements obtained during post-indictment interrogation by informant wearing a 
police radio transmitter.)    
41 McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 470. 
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in their employ, and the jailmate had affirmed this falsehood when he testified under oath 
at McCleskey’s trial.42   
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that McCleskey did not have a legitimate 
excuse for failing to raise the Sixth Amendment claim in his first petition, even though 
the evidence that supported the claim had been wrongfully withheld by the State.43  The 
Court reached that result through deadeningly technical reasoning, both figuratively and 
literally, ultimately changing the legal standard that applied to the situation.44  While 
McCleskey could have prevailed under the existing standard, the Court raised the bar for 
relief in front of him, arguably to an insurmountable level.   
 Structurally, both of McCleskey’s Supreme Court cases have this feature in 
common: after McCleskey appeared to meet the demands of an already exceedingly high 
burden of proof, the Court decided to insist on a higher burden.  In Zant, they do this 
despite the fact that the State had not asked for the change in successor habeas law, the 
parties had not litigated it, and the Court had to ignore some of the findings of fact that 
had led the District Court to hold for McCleskey.  Then, after discovering a new standard 
for permitting newly discovered evidence in a successor habeas petition, the Supreme 
Court refused to remand to the District Court for a determination as to whether he had 
                                                 
42 Id. at 497. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 493.  Prior to  McCleskey, the doctrine that applied in this scenario was derived from Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963) (holding that the Court can decide an issue first raised in a successor 
petition if it had not been deliberately abandoned in the first petition).  Sanders’ “deliberate abandonment” 
standard, as it was termed, simply required good-faith in raising all claims reasonably available to the 
petitioner.  Under this standard, McCleskey had an excellent chance of prevailing.  His odds plummeted 
when a majority of the justices in the Zant case articulated their preference for a new and stricter standard, 
known as the “cause and prejudice” standard, drawn from the state “procedural default” context, which bars 
appellants from raising issues in a federal habeas petition that were not raised in previous state habeas 
proceedings.  See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 493.  The Court held that, under the newly applied standard, 
McCleskey’s first habeas counsel’s reasonable belief that the Sixth Amendment claim had no factual basis 
did not excuse the failure to raise it, and because there was no external impediment to raising it, 
McCleskey’s opportunity to challenge his conviction on these grounds was permanently barred. Id. at 497– 
98, 
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satisfied the new standard.45  The majority simply declared, without benefit of argument 
or briefing on the subject, that he had not.   
The holding of McCleskey v.Zant is that McCleskey’s successor petition 
constituted an “abuse of the writ.”46  However, “abuse” seems more descriptive of the 
State’s actions than it does of the actions of McCleskey and his lawyers.47  Perhaps by 
projecting abuses on to McCleskey’s actions, the justices are concealing from themselves 
the abusive qualities of their own decisionmaking.  The Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
compelling habeas corpus arguments in Zant led a few months later to McCleskey’s 
execution  
 
C. Cultural Contexts 
After embedding both of McCleskey’s Supreme Court cases in some of their 
pertinent historical and doctrinal contexts, and highlighting the structural similarity 
between the two opinions, I turn the attention of my class more explicitly to interpreting 
their political and cultural contexts.  “Something profound has happened here,” I might 
say, “but what is it?  What does it teach us about law?”  Among the insights often formed 
in this discussion are variations on several themes: that despite its claim to autonomy, law 
does not float above culture and identity but participates actively in it; that in the face of 
felt necessities, legal doctrine can be malleable enough to serve perceived ideological and 
                                                 
45 These are procedural matters about which Justice Thurgood Marshall complains bitterly in his dissent.  
Id. at 506 (Marshall J., dissenting).  Marshall challenges the majority’s professed concern for the rule of 
law, when it “tosses aside established precedents without explanation, disregards the will of Congress, 
fashions rules that defy the reasonable expectations of the persons who must conform their conduct to the 
law’s dictates, and applies those rules in a way that rewards state misconduct and deceit.” Id. at 529. 
46 Id. at 497-503. 
47  Justice Marshall frames it this way: “Whatever ‘abuse of the writ’ today’s decision is designed to avert 
pales in comparison with the majority’s own abuse of the norms of proper judicial function.”  Id. at 529 
(Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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psychological needs; that the abstraction of doctrine helps mask its connection to these 
needs and helps disassociate it from their consequences; that the legal system grants 
rhetorical protections that serve a cultural function although it can deny them in reality 
whenever those protections will be too costly or too destabilizing to the status quo; that 
because of psychological and material investment in the idea that the past is past, and that 
the playing field is now level—proof to the contrary as presented by McCleskey 
notwithstanding—contemporary federal oversight of state criminal justice systems 
through constitutional law or habeas corpus will be resisted today for some of the same 
ideological reasons that it was resisted in the mid-nineteenth century.   
 One plausible conclusion is that we have come full circle: we have the same 
pattern of race disparities in capital punishment as we have always had; we have the same 
national legal organizations as were operating decades ago, incurring the wrath of judges 
for doing the same thing as they did then, that is representing poor defendants charged 
with capital crimes against white people and challenging the fairness of the state court 
processes that convict them.  48  But arguably the situation is now worse, because reformist 
impulses have been spent and, after extensive scrutiny, race disparities are now labeled 
“equal protection” and “non-discriminatory enforcement.”  Federal courts now look at a 
                                                 
48 Lazarus reports that in their secret conference on Lockhart v. McCree, supra note 34, a number of 
Supreme Court justices voiced contempt for the tactics and aims of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
(LDF), considering cases like Lockhart, and later McCleskey, as efforts to circumvent established law for 
purposes of abolishing the death penalty.  See Lazarus, supra note 29, at 189.  According to Lazarus, this 
hostility toward relentless advocacy in death penalty cases, led by LDF, was evident throughout the 
Supreme Court’s handling of the McCleskey case.  For example, during McCleskey’s oral argument,  
Justice White’s questioning impugned the integrity of the Baldus study, and “his large, flushed face 
contorted into a nasty scowl; his every word dripped with contempt.” Id., at 203.   Before the oral 
argument, Justice White had taken the rare step of circulating a memorandum to the five conservative 
justices, urging them to reject McCleskey’s claims. Id., at 202.  After oral argument but before the Justices’ 
conference on the case, Justice White circulated another memorandum in which he accused McCleskey’s 
attorney of misleading the Justices during the oral argument about whether McCleskey had received a plea 
offer, an ambiguous and contested point in the case record.  Lazarus asserts that “White was so suspicious 
of abolitionist lawyering that he was willing on flimsy evidence to implicitly accuse a leading lawyer at the 
nation’s foremost civil rights organization of baldly lying to the Court.” Id., at 205.   
 17
profoundly tipped playing field in state courts, pronounce it level, and affirm the integrity 
and finality of state criminal justice systems.  
After more than a century and a half of legal intervention invoked to ameliorate 
the same problems that McCleskey brought to the Court’s attention, lawyers perceived as 
abolitionists were rebuffed for interfering with the sovereign right of states to manage 
their affairs as they choose.  The 150-year-old echo resounds in chilling tones.  The 
Supreme Court of the late twentieth century, like the Supreme Court of the mid-
nineteenth century, authorized states to inflict violence on the basis of race.  In that 
respect, Justice Powell, the centrist, is situated not as far from Justice Taney as we might 
hope.49
 
D. Human Contexts 
My claim is that the progressive tilt of the content I have just described grows out 
of the power of context: the broader historical, doctrinal, and cultural norms, extant but 
suppressed, which lie beneath the surface of legal doctrine.  To counter the distancing 
facilitated by abstract doctrine and to confront the role that criminal law plays in 
affording some people the authority to kill others, I would also include in a progressive 
legal pedagogy another form of context: the human consequences of legal doctrine.  To 
truly grasp the peculiar institution of the death penalty—or of law in general—we must 
                                                 
49 When understood precisely, the point is less incendiary than it sounds.  It derives from the fact that both 
were Supreme Court justices hailing from the South who wrote opinions that gave a constitutional 
imprimatur to violent social practices that treated blacks and whites unequally.  Justice Taney did so most 
notoriously in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), and Justice Powell in McCleskey v. Kemp.  
Justice Powell, however, disavowed his holding only four years after he wrote it.  See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, 
JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451–52 (1994). 
 Lazarus views Powell’s inability to uphold McCleskey’s claims as derived from Powell’s need to 
believe that “the South had achieved a dramatic reformation on matters of race.”  Lazarus, supra note 29, at 
200.  To hold for McCleskey would be to undermine the “myth of southern progress” that Powell found 
sustaining.  Id. 
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not shield ourselves from the experience of the tragedies in which law participates.  From 
this perspective, attention must be paid50 to the life and death of Warren McCleskey. 
My proposition here is that consideration of Warren McCleskey’s cases is 
improved by some attention to Warren McCleskey, the person and petitioner.  In my class 
I include details such as these:  McCleskey confessed to participating with three others in 
an armed robbery of a furniture store, during which Officer Frank Schlatt, who responded 
to a silent alarm, was shot and killed.  Although another defendant instigated the robbery, 
McCleskey was the only one against whom the State sought the death penalty, because 
the prosecutor believed that it was McCleskey who pulled the trigger, something 
McCleskey always denied.  The prosecution bolstered its claim that McCleskey was the 
triggerperson and therefore deserved to die through the illegally obtained and perjured 
testimony of a jailmate who said in essence, “McCleskey told me that he was the one 
who shot Frank Schlatt.”  At trial McCleskey was represented by a lawyer who did no 
investigation, and who failed to read the prosecution file until the Friday before the trial 
began on Monday.  After the jury convicted McCleskey, a sentencing hearing 
commenced, during which his lawyer presented no evidence in mitigation.  After two 
hours of deliberation, the jury sentenced McCleskey to death.51  This death sentence 
withstood thirteen years of appellate and post-conviction review on a number of 
compelling legal issues. 
                                                 
50 The allusion to Arthur Miller’s wrenching tale Death of A Salesman is intentional.  Speaking to her son, 
Willy Loman’s wife Linda pleads, “I don’t say he’s a great man….But he’s a human being, and a terrible 
thing is happening to him.  So attention must be paid.  He’s not to be allowed to fall into his grave like an 
old dog.  Attention, attention must be finally paid to such a person.”   See Arthur Miller, DEATH OF A  
SALESMAN: CERTAIN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS IN TWO ACTS AND A REQUIEM 56 (1949),    
51 See Lazarus, supra note 27, at 170-181. 
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I might add that Warren McCleskey became deeply religious on death row.  He 
started a death row poor fund, asking death-sentenced inmates to pool their meager 
individual resources to fund supplies for the neediest inmates who could not afford to buy 
supplies from the commissary.52  As his execution date neared, those who spoke to him 
reported that McCleskey took comfort in the hope that the injustices in his case might 
disturb people enough to hasten the demise of capital punishment.53   
The narrative then turns to September 25, 1991, when McCleskey was strapped 
into the electric chair and began his final statement, then received a stay of execution, 
was unstrapped, and returned to his cell.  Fifteen minutes later, the stay was dissolved and 
Warden Walter Zant, presiding over the grim scene, had McCleskey strapped into the 
chair again.  McCleskey finished his final statement and was electrocuted.  In these 
torturous circumstances, McCleskey managed utterances that are stunning in their power 
and clarity, and frankly in their length, especially in contrast to the clipped voice of the 
warden-bureaucrat.  In one especially poignant excerpt, McCleskey thanks God “for 
mercy, love, and grace extending to me” and prayed that the family of the victim would 
find it “in their hearts to forgive me not so much for me, but that they should be free—
free of the spiritual weight of unforgiveness that continues to hold their lives in bondage 
[and] keeps destroying the happiness and peace that they desire.”54
In my view, a progressive pedagogy of the death penalty would include this 
context as well because it is the only time in this unbearably tragic story of law that the 
                                                 
 
52 These events are recounted in detail by William Neal Moore,a former Georgia death row inmate and co-
participant in these efforts.  See William Neal Moore, Remembering Warren, HOSPITALITY, January, 
1992, at 5. 
53 See Joyce Hollyday, A Gift of Dignity, SOUJOURNER, January, 1992 at 24–26. 
54 Id., at 26.  See also Phyllis Goldfarb, The Power of Last Words, BC LAW MAGAZINE, Spring/Summer 
2005, at 27,53. 
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voice of the subaltern, Warren McCleskey himself, is heard.55  Apart from anything else, 
the grace and eloquence that he reveals in that unimaginable situation of being strapped 
into, removed from, then returned to the electric chair, is potentially and fundamentally 
the most subversive of all.   
 
                                                 
55 Content like this is ordinarily avoided in the law school classroom as it elicits strong emotions and may 
be viewed as irrelevant.  While I do not seek to sensationalize the study of law, I do want students to 
appreciate law’s importance and implications, which are harder to grasp—and harder yet to care about—
when law’s effects, emotionally laden or otherwise, are sidestepped.  For a discussion of emotions in the 
classroom, see Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Schultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason": Toward 
Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1774 (1993) (arguing that although law professors 
“traditionally shun openly-expressed emotions in the classroom  . . . emotions can never successfully be 
eliminated from any truly important intellectual undertaking, in the law or elsewhere”). 
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